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Abstract
We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation and
subject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis
we nd that the di¤erent predictions of previous imitation models are
due to di¤erent informational assumptions, not to di¤erent behavioral
rules. It is more important whom one imitates rather than how. In a
laboratory experiment we test the di¤erent theories by systematically
varying information conditions. We nd signicant e¤ects of seemingly
innocent changes in information. Moreover, the generalized imitation
model predicts the di¤erences between treatments well. The data pro-
vide support for imitation on the individual level, both in terms of
choice and in terms of perception. But imitation is not unconditional.
Rather individuals propensity to imitate more successful actions is
increasing in payo¤ di¤erences.
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1 Introduction
Everyone who watches children growing up will attest that imitation is one of
the main sources of learning. And introspection shows that imitation plays a
signicant role also for adult learning. In fact, imitation is prevalent in much
of everyday decision making, in particular when the environment is complex
or largely unknown. Openings in chess games are a good example or nding
routes through tra¢ c, or buying complex consumer items like cars, laptop
computers, or digital cameras. But, while social scientists and psychologists
have long recognized the importance of imitation (see Ash, 1952, for an early
example), imitation has only recently moved into the focus of economists.
Important theoretical advances towards understanding imitation have
been made by VegaRedondo (1997) and Schlag (1998 and 1999). Both
approaches are based on the idea that individuals who face repeated choice
problems will imitate others who obtained high payo¤s. But despite this
basic similarity, the two theories imply markedly di¤erent predictions when
applied to specic games. For example, for games with a Cournot struc-
ture, Schlags model predicts CournotNash equilibrium play, while Vega
Redondos model predicts the Walrasian outcome. The latter prediction is
also obtained by Selten and Ostmanns (2001) notion of an imitation equi-
librium, while CournotNash is also predicted by imitation models with
large population as studied by Björnerstedt and Weibull (1996).
The current paper makes two main contributions. First, it introduces a
generalized theoretical approach to imitation, which enables us to analyze
why the models of VegaRedondo (1997) and Schlag (1998, 1999) come to
such di¤erent predictions. Basically, the models di¤er along two di¤erent
dimensions, the informational structure (whom agents imitate) and the
behavioral rule (how agents imitate). While agents in Vega-Redondos
model observe their immediate competitors, in Schlags model they observe
others who are just like them but play in di¤erent groups against di¤erent
opponents. Additionally, agents in Vega-Redondos model copy the most
successful action of the previous period whenever they can. In contrast,
Schlags agents only imitate in a probabilistic fashion and the probability
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with which they imitate is proportional to the observed di¤erence in pay-
o¤s between own and most successful action. We show that the di¤erence
between the two models is due to the di¤erent informational assumptions
rather than the di¤erent adjustment rules. In that sense, it is more impor-
tant whom one imitates than how one imitates. In particular, if one imitates
ones own opponents, outcomes become very competitive. If, on the other
hand, one imitates other players who face the same problem as oneself but
play against di¤erent opponents, Nash equilibrium play is obtained.
The second objective of our paper is to present rigorous experimental
tests of the di¤erent imitation models. We chose to study imitation in a
normal form game with the payo¤ structure of a simple discrete Cournot
game. This has the advantage that the theoretical predictions of the various
imitation models are very distinct. Both traditional benchmark outcomes
of oligopoly models (CournotNash equilibrium and Bertrand equilibrium)
are supported by at least one imitation model. Also, the games are easy
to implement in an experiment, and we have a good understanding of how
Cournot markets operate in laboratory environments under di¤erent cir-
cumstances.1 The key design feature of our experiment is that we vary
the feedback information subjects receive between rounds of play. In one
treatment they observe their competitors actions and prots, in another
they observe the actions and prots of others who are like them but played
against di¤erent people. And, nally, there is a treatment where agents have
access to both types of information.
On some level, these variations appear to be very innocent and many
(learning) models would not predict any di¤erence between them. In that
sense, the experimental part of our study examines whether (and if so how)
slight variations in the informational structure of a repeated-game setting
have an impact on behavior. We nd that the variations indeed have sig-
nicant e¤ects. Moreover, the directions of these e¤ects are well organized
by our generalized imitation model. Specically, average prots are ranked
according to the theoretical predictions and signicantly so: The treatment
1See e.g. Plott (1989), Holt (1995), and Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2004) for
surveys.
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in which opponents can be observed is the most competitive. The treat-
ment in which only subjects in other groups can be observed is roughly in
line with the CournotNash equilibrium prediction and is the least compet-
itive. Intermediate outcomes result if subjects have access to both types of
information.
Analyzing individual adjustments, we nd strong support for imitative
behavior. Simple imitation can explain a surprisingly large fraction of sub-
jectsdecisions. But subjects di¤er in their propensity to imitate. While
some imitate not more often than a randomization device would, others
are almost pure imitators. In general though, we nd that, much in line
with Schlags model, the likelihood of imitation increases in the di¤erence
between the highest payo¤ observed and the own payo¤. In addition, we
nd that imitation is more pronounced when subjects observe their direct
competitors rather than others who have the same role but play in di¤erent
groups.
All these results are obtained from studying choice data. Subjects do
imitate and they do it in specic ways. Whether or not subjects are aware of
this, is a di¤erent issue on which we shed some light by analyzing replies to
a postexperimental questionnaire. Interestingly, many replies quite clearly
reveal that subjects know what they are doing. Quite a number of subjects
perceive themselves as imitating.
Despite being inherently behavioral, there have been few prior exper-
iments on imitation. In particular, Schlags imitation model has not been
experimentally tested at all, while the models of VegaRedondo and Selten
and Ostmann have been subject to isolated experiments. Huck, Normann,
and Oechssler (1999, 2000) and O¤erman, Potters, and Sonnemans (2002)
nd experimental support for Vega-Redondos model. Also, Abbink and
Brandts (2002) provide data that are well-organized by a model closely re-
lated to Vega-Redondos. Finally, Selten and Apesteguia (2004) nd some
experimental support for Selten and Ostmanns (2001) static model of imi-
tation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the games and the experimental details. In Section 3 we review the imita-
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tion models, introduce a general framework, and derive theoretical results.
In Section 4 the experimental results are reported and, nally, Section 5
concludes. Most proofs are collected in Appendix A. Appendix B contains a
treatment of Selten and Ostmanns imitation equilibrium. The instructions
for the experiment are shown in Appendix C, and Appendix D contains
additional regression results.
2 Experimental design and procedures
In our experiments subjects repeatedly play simple 3player normal form
games, with a payo¤ structure that is derived from a symmetric Cournot
game. All players have ve pure strategies with identical labels, a; b; c; d;
and e. Subjects are, however, not told anything about the games payo¤
function apart from the fact that their payo¤ deterministically depends on
their own choice and the choices of two others, and that the payo¤ function
is the same throughout all of the experiment (see the translated instructions
in Appendix C).
Interaction in the experiment takes place in populations of nine subjects.
Each subject has a role and belongs to a group. There are three roles,
labelled X;Y; and Z, lled by three subjects each. Roles are allocated
randomly at the beginning of the session and then kept xed for the entire
session. Sessions last for 60 periods. In each period, subjects are randomly
matched into three groups, such that always one Xplayer is matched with
one of the Yplayers and one of the Zplayers. Subjects are informed about
this interaction technology. One might wonder why we introduce roles to
study behavior in a symmetric game. The answer is twofold. First, it is
exactly this trick that allows us to disentangle the e¤ects of imitation
rules and information. Second, we will be able to use the identical setup for
studying asymmetric games in follow-up projects.
While subjects know that they are randomly matched each period, they
are not told with whom they are matched and there are no subject-specic
labels. In each experimental session, two independent populations of nine
subjects participate to increase anonymity. After each period, subjects learn
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their own payo¤. Additional feedback information depends on the treat-
ment. There are three treatments altogether.
Treatment ROLE In treatment ROLE a player is informed, after each
period t, of the actions and payo¤s in t of players who have the same
role as himself but play in di¤erent groups.
Treatment GROUP In treatment GROUP a player is informed, after
each period t, of the actions and payo¤s in t of players in his own
group.
Treatment FULL In treatment FULL a player can observe all the infor-
mation given in treatments ROLE and GROUP and learn the average
payo¤ in the entire population.2
The payo¤ table (unknown to subjects) is displayed in Table 1. The
payo¤s are compatible with a linear Cournot market with inverse demand,
p = 120   X, and zero costs. In this case, the strategies a; b; c; d; and e
correspond to the output quantities 20, 23, 30, 36, and 40, respectively.3
That is, a corresponds to the symmetric joint prot maximizing output, c
to the Cournot output, and e to the symmetric Walrasian output, where
price equals marginal cost (of zero). Subjects are told that the experimental
payo¤s are converted to Euros using an exchange rate of 3000:1.4
The computerized experiments5 were carried out in the Laboratory for
Experimental Research in Economics in Bonn. Subjects were recruited via
posters on campus. For each treatment we carried out three sessions 
each with two independent populations of nine subjects, which gives us six
independent observations per treatment. Accordingly, the total number of
subjects was 162 (= 9  6  3). The experiments lasted on average 70
minutes, and average payments were 15.25 Euros.6 After the 60 rounds
2Notice that in FULL a player cannot observe the choices and payo¤s of players that
are neither in his group nor in his role.
3Note however, that any positive transformation of these quantities, together with an
appropriate transformation of the payo¤ function, would also yield the payo¤s in Table 1.
4 In the rst session of treatment FULL we used an exchange rate of 4000:1.
5The program was written with ztree of Fischbacher (1999).
6At the time of the experiment one Euro was worth about one US dollar.
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Table 1: Payo¤ table
action combination of other players in group
aa ab ac ad ae bb bc bd be cc cd ce dd de ee
a 1200 1140 1000 880 800 1080 940 820 740 800 680 600 560 480 400
b 1311 1242 1081 943 851 1173 1012 874 782 851 713 621 575 483 391
c 1500 1410 1200 1020 900 1320 1110 930 810 900 720 600 540 420 300
d 1584 1476 1224 1008 864 1368 1116 900 756 864 648 504 432 288 144
e 1600 1480 1200 960 800 1360 1080 840 680 800 560 400 320 160 0
Note: The order in which the actions of the other group members is displayed does
not matter.
subjects were presented with a questionnaire in which they were asked for
their major eld of study and for the motivation of their decisions.
3 Imitation models
3.1 Theory
In this section we will establish theoretical predictions for various imitation
models in the context of our experimental design. Recall that the treatments
vary with respect to the information subjects receive about actions and/or
payo¤s in the previous round. Let player (i; j)t be the player who has
role i 2 fX;Y; Zg in group j 2 f1; 2; 3g at time t, and let sji (t) be that
players strategy in t. We refer to the set of individuals whose actions
and payo¤s can be observed by individual (i; j)t; as (i; j)ts reference group,
R(i; j)t. Individual (i; j)ts set of observed actions includes all actions played
by someone in his reference group and is denoted by
O(i; j)t := fskh(t)j(h; k)t 2 R(i; j)tg:
Notice that (i; j)t 2 R(i; j)t and sji (t) 2 O(i; j)t in all our experimental
treatments.
Following Schlag (1999) we call a behavioral rule imitating if it prescribes
for each individual to choose an observed action from the previous round.
A noisy imitating rule is a rule that is imitating with probability 1  " and
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allows for mistakes with probability " > 0. (In case of a mistake any other
action is chosen with positive probability.) A behavioral rule with inertia
allows an individual to change his action only with probability  2 (0; 1) in
each round. In the following we shall rst characterize di¤erent imitation
rules according to their properties without noise and inertia. Predictions for
the Cournot game will then be derived by adding noise and inertia.
A popular and plausible rule is imitate the best (see e.g. Vega
Redondo, 1997), which simply prescribes to choose the strategy that in the
previous period performed best among the observed actions. In our setting
it is possible that an action yields di¤erent payo¤s in di¤erent groups. This
implies that it is a priori not clear how an agent should evaluate the ac-
tions he observes. An evaluation rule assigns a value to each action in a
players set of observed actions O(i; j)t. When an action yields the same
payo¤ everywhere in his reference group, there is no ambiguity and the ac-
tion is evaluated with this observed payo¤.7 When di¤erent payo¤s occur
for the same action, various rules might be applied. Below we will focus on
two evaluation rules that appear particularly natural in a simple imitation
setting with boundedly rational agents: the max rule where each strategy is
evaluated according to the highest payo¤ it received, and the average rule
where each strategy is evaluated according to the average payo¤ observed
in the reference group. Of course, other rules, such as a pessimisticmin
rule, might also have some good justication. Nevertheless, we shall follow
the previous literature and focus on the max and the average rules.8
Denition 1 An imitating rule is called imitate the bestif it satises the
property that (without noise and inertia) an agent switches to a new action
if and only if this action has been played by an agent in his reference group
in the previous round, and was evaluated as at least as good as that of any
other action played in his reference group. When several actions satisfy this,
each is chosen with positive probability.
7This is always the case in treatment GROUP.
8For imitate the best average see, e.g., Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) and Schlag
(1999). For imitate the best maxsee Selten and Ostmann (2001).
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 Imitate the bestcombined with the average rule is called imitate the
best average (IBA).
 Imitate the best combined with the max rule is called imitate the
best max (IBM).
Schlag (1998) shows in the context of a decision problem in which agents
can observe one other participant that imitate the bestand many other
plausible rules do not satisfy certain optimality conditions. Instead, Schlag
(1998) advocates the Proportional Imitation Rulewhich prescribes to im-
itate an action with a probability proportional to the (positive part of the)
payo¤ di¤erence between that actions payo¤ from last period and the own
payo¤ from last period. If the observed action yielded a lower payo¤, it is
never imitated.
The extension of this analysis to the case of agents observing two or
more actions is not straightforward. Schlag (1999) considers the case of two
observations and singles out two rules that are both optimalaccording to
a number of plausible criteria: the double imitation rule (DI), and the
sequential proportional observation rule (SPOR). In both cases, Schlag
assumes that strategies are evaluated with the average rule. Specifying the
two rules in more detail is beyond the scope of this study since our data do
not allow to check more than some general properties of classes of rules to
which DI and SPOR belong.
Schlag (1999, Remark 2) shows that with two observations both, DI and
SPOR, satisfy the following properties:
(i) They are imitating rules.
(ii) The probability of imitating another action increases with that actions
previous payo¤, and decreases with the payo¤ the (potential) imitator
achieved himself.
(iii) If all actions in O(i; j)t are distinct, the more successful actions are
imitated with higher probability.
Furthermore, it can be shown that DI satises the following properties.
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(iv) Never switch to an action with an average payo¤ lower than the average
payo¤ of the own action.
(v) Imitate the action with the highest average payo¤ in the sample with
strictly positive probability (unless one already plays an action with
the best average payo¤).
Property (iv) shows that DI belongs to the large class of imitating rules
that use the average evaluation rule and can be described as imitate only
if better. Combined with property (v) imitate the best with positive
probability, this is all we need for deriving the theoretical properties of DI
and similar rules in the context of our experiment.
Denition 2 An imitating rule is called a weakly imitate the best average
rule (WIBA) if it satises (without noise and inertia) properties (iv) and
(v).
If we modify Properties (iv) and (v) to allow for the max rule, we obtain
(iv0) Never switch to an action with a maximal payo¤ lower than the max-
imal payo¤ of the own action.
(v0) Imitate the action with the highest maximal payo¤ in the sample with
strictly positive probability (unless one already plays an action with
the highest maximal payo¤).
Denition 3 An imitating rule is called a weakly imitate the best max
rule (WIBM) if it satises (without noise and inertia) properties (iv) and
(v).
While IBA (imitate the best average) as well as DI (double imita-
tion) belong to the class of WIBA (weakly imitate the best average)
rules, IBM belongs to WIBM. The rule SPOR does not belong to either
class of rules since it violates (iv) and (iv).
Both, WIBA and WIBM allow for a large variety of specic adjustment
rules, including Vega-Redondos imitate the best rule as well as forms of
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probabilistic adjustment as considered by Schlag. In the following, we will
state all results for these rather large classes of rules. Hence, it is in this sense
that we will conclude that the informational structure (whom to imitate) is
more important than the specic rule (how to imitate).
Before we proceed with deriving theoretical predictions, we need to in-
troduce some further notation. The imitation dynamics induce a Markov
chain on a nite state space 
. A state ! 2 
 is characterized by three strat-
egy proles, one for each group, i.e., by a collection ((s11; s
1
2; s
1
3); (s
2
1; s
2
2; s
2
3);
(s31; s
3
2; s
3
3)). Notice that there is no need to refer to specic individuals in
the denition of a state, i.e., here sji (without the time index) refers to the
strategy used by whoever has role i and happens to be in group j.
We shall refer to uniform states as states where s = sji = s
k
h for all
i; j; h; k and denote a uniform state by !s, s 2 fa; b; c; d; eg. Two uniform
states will be of particular interest. The state in which everybody plays the
Cournot Nash strategy c, to which we will refer as the Cournot state !c;
and the state in which everybody plays the Walrasian strategy e, to which
we shall refer as the Walrasian state !e.
To analyze the properties of the Markov processes induced by the vari-
ous imitation rules discussed above, we shall now add (vanishing) noise and
inertia. That is, whenever we refer in the following to some rule as, for ex-
ample imitate the best(or, in short, IBM), we shall imply that agents are
subject to, both, inertia and (vanishing) noise. States that are in the sup-
port of the limit invariant distribution of the process (for "! 0) are called
stochastically stable. The (graph theoretic) methods for analyzing stochastic
stability (pioneered in economics by Canning, 1992, Kandori, Mailath, and
Rob, 1993, and Young, 1993) are, by now, standard (see e.g. Fudenberg and
Levine, 1998, and Young, 1998, for text book treatments).
In the following we will state a number of propositions that show how
the long-run predictions of the imitation rules we consider depend on the
underlying informational structures. We begin by stating results for WIBA
and WIBM. It will turn out that WIBA and WIBM rules lead to identi-
cal predictions if agents either observe other agents in their group or other
agents in the same role. They di¤er if agents can observe both as in treat-
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ment FULL. Finally, we will analyze SPOR rules and show that they yield
the same long-run predictions regardless of the treatment.
Our rst proposition concerns WIBA and WIBM rules in treatment
GROUP.
Proposition 1 If agents follow either a WIBA (weakly imitate the best
average) or a WIBM (weakly imitate the best max) rule and if the refer-
ence group is as in treatment GROUP, the Walrasian state !e is the unique
stochastically stable state.
Proof See Appendix A.
The intuition for this result is analogous to the intuition in Vega-Redondos
original treatment of the imitate the best rule. In any given group, the agent
with the highest output obtains the highest prot as long as prices are pos-
itive. This induces a push toward more competitive outcomes.9 Insofar,
Proposition 1 can be seen as generalization of Vega-Redondos original re-
sult to the case where agents might be randomly rematched. As long as the
informational structure is such that agents observe only their competitors
(in the last period) the Walrasian outcome results.
Let us now turn to treatment ROLE where (h; k)t 2 R(i; j)t if h = i.
We will see that the change of the informational structure has dramatic
consequences. If agents can only observe others who are in the same role
as they themselves but play in di¤erent groups, the unique stochastically
stable outcome under both, WIBA rule and WIBM rules, is the Cournot
Nash equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 2 If agents follow a WIBA or a WIBM rule and if the ref-
erence group is as in treatment ROLE, the Cournot state !c is the unique
stochastically stable state.
Proof See Appendix A.
9 Introducing constant positive marginal cost does not change the result. If price is
below marginal cost, the agent with the lowest output is imitated which again pushes the
process towards the Walrasian state.
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The intuition for Proposition 2 is that any deviation from the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium play lowers the deviators absolute payo¤. Agents in the
same role will observe this but will not imitate because they earn more
using the equilibrium strategy. On the other hand, every non-equilibrium
state can be left by a single mutation, namely by having an agent who is
currently not playing his best reply switch to his best reply. This improves
his payo¤ and will be observed by other agents in the same role who will
follow suit. What remains to be shown is that one can construct sequences
of one-shot mutations that lead into the Cournot state from any other state.
To establish this claim we use the fact that the game at hand has a potential.
Comparing Propositions 1 and 2 establishes our earlier claim. While the
specics of an imitation rule do not matter as long as the rule falls in the
rather large class of WIBA and WIBM rules, changing the informational
structure has a profound e¤ect on long-run behavior. Turning to treatment
FULL one might expect that its richer informational structure (with agents
having the combined information of treatments GROUP and ROLE) causes
some tension between the Walrasian and the Cournot outcome. It turns
out that this intuition is correct. In fact, with a WIBA rule there are two
stochastically stable states in treatment FULL, the Cournot state (where
everybody plays c), and the state where everybody plays d.
Proposition 3 If agents follow a WIBA rule and if the reference group is
as in treatment FULL, then both, the Cournot state !c and the state in
which everyone takes action d, !d, are the stochastically stable states.
Proof See Appendix A.
Comparing a WIBA rule with a WIBM rule, one might say that agents
following WIBM are more aggressive. Hence, one might intuitively expect
that WIBM leads to higher quantities than WIBA. As the next proposition
shows this is true in the sense that, in addition to !c and !d, the Walrasian
state, !e, is stochastically stable under WIBM.
Proposition 4 If agents follow a WIBM rule and if the reference group is
as in treatment FULL, then the Cournot state !c, the state in which everyone
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takes action d, !d, and the Walrasian state !e are the stochastically stable
states.
Proof See Appendix A.
The proof of Propositions 3 shows that specics of the payo¤ function
matter for the exact prediction under WIBA. A generalization for a larger
class of payo¤ functions would predict outcomes ranging from the Cournot to
some more competitive outcomes (without exactly specifying the boundary).
On the other hand, the proofs for Propositions, 1, 2, and 4 do not make use
of anything that is specic to our chosen payo¤ function and it is easy to see
that they could be generalized to a large class of Cournot games in exactly
the same form as above.
Finally, in contrast to the previous studied rules, the SPOR rule of Schlag
(1999) also allows to imitate actions that do worse than the current action
one is using. This has the consequence that, in the framework of stochastic
stability, any uniform state can be a long run outcome of the process.
Proposition 5 If agents follow a SPOR rule, all uniform states are sto-
chastically stable regardless of their reference group.
Proof Agents following SPOR imitate any strategy with positive proba-
bility except an action that yields 0, the absolutely worst payo¤ (see
Schlag, 1999). Thus, we observe a) that only uniform states are ab-
sorbing and b) that it is possible to move from any uniform state to
any other uniform state by just one mutation, which implies that all
uniform states are stochastically stable.
In the appendix we also analyze the predictions of Selten and Ostmanns
(2001) imitation equilibrium. Interestingly, it turns out that, despite its
static character, it makes the same predictions about behavior in the long
run as the class of dynamic WIBM rules.
3.2 Some qualitative hypotheses and simulations
Table 2 summarizes the theoretical results and indicates for each behavioral
rule considered above whether two easy-to-check properties are satised.
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Table 2: Summary of predictions
Imitation rule
never imitate
worse than own long run prediction

WIBA X
!e in GROUP
!c in ROLE
!c; !d in FULL
DI X as WIBA
IBA X as WIBA
WIBM X
!e in GROUP
!c in ROLE
!c; !d; !e in FULL
IBM X as WIBM
SPOR  !a; !b; !c; !d; !e
Note: A X" indicates that the theory in question satises the property given the
rule to evaluate payo¤s.  " indicates that the theory does not in general satisfy
this property.  This prediction is without noise. This is the set of stochastically
stable outcomes.
All imitation rules, with the exception of SPOR, have in common that
they predict that agents should not switch to strategies that are evaluated
as worse than the strategy they are currently using. With respect to average
prots in the Cournot market games, all imitation rules, except SPOR, sug-
gest that prots in treatment GROUP (where Walrasian levels are expected
in the long run) should be rather low, whereas in treatment ROLE prots
around the Cournot outcome are expected. Finally, the theoretical results
suggest for treatment FULL prots between GROUP and ROLE. Thus, we
obtain the following qualitative hypothesis about the ordering of prots:10
QH : GROUP  FULL  ROLE:
Hypothesis QH has, strictly speaking two parts. First, it suggests that
there is a di¤erence between the experimental treatments (what many other
10Hypothesis QH provides a convenient summary of the predictions in one dimension.
Formulating the hypothesis in terms of prots (rather than quantities) makes sense because
prots are invariant to the transformations described in Footnote 3.
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theories would not predict). Second, it suggests a particular order that would
be expected if imitation is an important force for subjectsadaptations.
The problem with long run predictions derived from stochastic stability
analysis is that they are just that: long run predictions. Furthermore, in
general they crucially depend on the assumption of vanishing noise. Thus,
the issue arises how imitation processes behave in the short run and in the
presence of non-vanishing noise. In order to address this issue, we run simu-
lations for the di¤erent treatments. In particular, we simulate population of
9 players over 60 rounds when each player behaves according to the IBM rule
(IBA yields almost identical results) given the reference group dened by the
respective treatment. The noise level we use is substantial: with probability
0.8 in each round a player follows IBM and with probability 0.2 a player
chooses randomly one of the ve actions (each then with equal probability).
For each treatment we simulate 100 such populations with starting actions
chosen from a uniform distribution.
Figure ?? shows relative frequencies of actions in these simulations. Al-
ready after 20-30 rounds, behavior is fairly constant. Thus, we report fre-
quencies aggregated over rounds 31 through 60. The prediction !e for treat-
ment GROUP is clearly conrmed by the simulations. Apart from action
e, all other actions survive only due to the relatively high noise level. Like-
wise, in treatment FULL the prediction of IBM is fully conrmed, namely
that !e, !d; and !c are all stochastically stable. In treatment ROLE, the
predicted action c is also the modal and median choice. However, conver-
gence seems to be relatively slow. The reason seems to be the following. In
treatment ROLE the number of absorbing states (of the unperturbed imita-
tion process) is higher than in the other treatments because besides uniform
states, all states in which players in a given role play the same action are
absorbing (see the proof of Proposition 2). A detailed look at the simula-
tions reveals that indeed the process often gets stuck in such states which
of course slows down convergence.
Averaged over the last 30 periods, average prots in the simulations were
855.3 for ROLE, 591.1 for FULL, and 204.9 for GROUP, di¤erences being
signicant at any conventional signicance level. Therefore, importantly,
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the theoretical predictions we obtained for the long run and with vanishing
noise appear rather robust also for the short run and in the presence of noise.
4 Experimental results
We now turn to the experimental analysis of the generalized imitation frame-
work proposed above. We organize this section as follows. First, based on
the qualitative hypotheses QH, we evaluate the data on the aggregate level.
This will show whether and, if so, how the di¤erent informational structures
a¤ect subjects behavior. While this will provide some indirect evidence
for the relevance of imitation, a more thorough study of imitation must be
based on data from individual adjustments. Thus, in Section 4.2 we ana-
lyze individual data by counting how often actual adjustments are in line
with predicted adjustments. This is followed in Section 4.3 by a regression
analysis that helps us to test whether the probability of imitating is indeed,
as Schlags models suggest, a function of the observed payo¤ di¤erences.
Finally, we conclude this section by analyzing the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire. This will provide additional insight into whether subjects are
intentional imitators or whether it just looks as if they are.
4.1 Aggregate behavior
We begin by considering some summary statistics on the aggregate level.
Table 3 shows average prots for all treatments, separately for the rst
round, all 60 rounds of the experiment, and the last 30 rounds. Standard
deviations of the six observations per treatment are shown in parentheses.
Considering Table 3 we nd no signicant di¤erence between average
prots in the rst round according to MWU tests (see, e.g., Siegel and
Castellan, 1988) on the basis of the average prot per population. However,
the di¤erences in prots over all 60 and the last 30 rounds are highly signi-
cant. The pvalues for (twosided) MWU tests based on rounds 31 through
60 are as follows:
GROUP :037 FULL :006 ROLE.
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Treatment
ROLE GROUP FULL
avg. prots, round 1
974:1
(163:3)
1011:0
(137:6)
1001:7
(139:6)
avg. prots, rounds 1-60
824:1
(24:96)
634:9
(60:8)
731:0
(55:9)
avg. prots, rounds 31-60
804:6
(32:69)
604:6
(73:88)
691:1
(61:57)
Note: Standard deviations of avg. prots of the 6 independent observations per
treatment are given in parentheses.
This is exactly in line with the qualitative predictions of the generalized
imitation model derived in the previous section. Prots in ROLE are higher
than in FULL, and in FULL higher than in GROUP. Notice also that the
di¤erences are rather substantial in economic terms.
Figure ?? shows relative frequencies of actions per treatment for the
second half of the experiment. According to (twosided) MWU tests, action
e is chosen signicantly more often in GROUP than in ROLE at the 1%
level. On the other hand, action a is chosen signicantly more often in
ROLE than in GROUP at the 1% level. Furthermore, action e is chosen
more often in GROUP than in FULL, and action a is chosen more often in
ROLE than in FULL, both at the 5% level.
Both, Table 3 and Figure ??, clearly show that the seemingly innocent
changes in information conditions have a systematic impact on behavior.
However, the quantitative di¤erences in average prots and the distribution
of actions are less pronounced than predicted by imitation theory, which
indicates that other factors play a role, too.
For now, we summarize our ndings in the following two statements.
Result 1 The reference group has a signicant impact on behavior.
Result 2 Prots are ordered as predicted by hypothesis QH.
Given the usual noise in experimental data from human subjects, Result
2 seems quite remarkable. However, before drawing more denite conclu-
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sions about the viability of imitation it is necessary to analyze individual
adjustments which we shall do in the following section.
4.2 Individual Behavior
A proper experimental test of imitation theories needs to consider individual
data. Thus, in this section we evaluate the success of the imitation models
by computing compliance rates of individual adjustment behavior with the
predictions of the respective models. We begin by classifying individual
behavior into the following categories: (i) Best: the subject played last
periods best evaluated action in his reference group, (ii) Better: the subject
switched to an action that was evaluated as better than his own action, but
not as the best, (iii) Same: the subject did not change his action despite
observing a better strategy in his reference group, (iv) Worse: the subject
changed to an action that was evaluated as worse than his own action, and
(v) Di¤erent: the subject changed to an action that was not observed in
the reference group. Table 4 reports how many decisions fall into each of
the categories (i) through (v) for each treatment and both evaluation rules.
The di¤erences between the max and the average rules are very small which
is due to the fact that the two rules typically prescribe the same actions
(because the strategy with the highest max is typically also the one with
the highest average). Only in less than 2% of all cases do they diverge.
Hence, for ease of presentation we will focus on the max rule from now on.
There are a couple of observations which are immediate from inspecting
Table 4:
 There is very little switching to worse or better (but not best) actions.
Most subjects either repeat their previous choice, imitate the most
successful action, or experiment by switching to a new action.
 Imitation of the previously most successful action is most prevalent in
treatment GROUP.
Recall that WIBA and WIBM predict that agents should not switch to
actions evaluated as worse than the own action in the previous round. Table
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Table 4: Classication of Individual Behavior by Type of Change
Best Better Same Worse Di¤erent
ROLE
34:9%
35:9%
1:7%
1:8%
13:4%
12:3%
8:5%
8:5%
41:5%
GROUP 41:2% 2:3% 18:1% 5:3% 33:1%
FULL
32:6%
32:8%
7:0%
7:1%
22:8%
22:7%
11:1%
10:9%
26:5%
Note: Reported are the percentages of subjects that switched to actions in the
various categories. Upper values are calculated using the average rule, lower values
by using the max rule.
4 shows that pooled over all treatments only 8.3% of choices violate this con-
dition. To put this rate into perspective, we need a method that contrasts it
with the corresponding rate that would obtain if there were no relation be-
tween behavior and imitation. We use the following method. We randomly
simulate the behavior of 100 populations of nine players for 60 periods, and
calculate the success of the hypothesis relative to this simulated data. In
order to give random behavior the best shot, we take the experimentally
observed frequencies of actions as the theoretical distribution from which
random behavior is generated. That is, we generate i.i.d. behavior in each
round from the aggregate experimentally observed frequencies. The simu-
lations show that random behavior would violate the never imitate worse
than owncondition in 16% of cases, which is signicantly higher than the
actual rate at all standard signicance levels according to a MWU test.
Result 3 On average, the never imitate worse than owncondition is vi-
olated in only 8.3% of cases which signicantly outperforms random
predictions.
Another interesting way of slicing through the data shown in Table 4 is
to compute how often subjects are in line with the predictions of a simple
imitation rule like IBM. We classify behavior as compliant with IBM if either
the best action was imitated or there was no change in action (inertia). Thus,
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by summing the values obtained for Bestand Same in Table 4 we nd
a compliance rate of 58.3% pooled over all treatments. Given that there
are many nonimitating choices, it is not surprising that this rate is not
terribly high, although it is signicantly higher than under random play,
which would yield a compliance rate of 34.6% (using the method described
above).11 This further conrms that imitation is present in our data, and
that, in particular, IBM and IBA play a signicant role in explaining it.
One can also compute a compliance rate for IBM given that subjects play
an action they have previously observed.12 In ROLE this yields a compliance
rate of 82.9%, in GROUP 88.6%, and in FULL 75.5%. These rates are very
high and indicate that when players imitate, they mostly imitate the best.
So far, we have only examined averages across subjects. But, as one
would expect, there is substantial heterogeneity in subjectspropensity to
imitate. Figure 1 shows the distribution of individual players on the basis
of the (unconditional) compliance rates for IBM (for all treatments pooled
together). About 10% of the players show a percentage of unconditional
compliance with IBM above 80%. This suggests that there is a sizeable
number of almost pure imitators. It is also worth noting that more than
35% of the participants comply with IBM in more than 60% of all decisions.
Let us summarize this by stating a further result.
Result 4 IBM and IBA do about equally well, and both outperform random
predictions signicantly. Moreover, 10% of subjects are almost pure
imitators whose choices are in line with IBM/IBA in more than 80%
of all decisions.
Finally, let us briey discuss the second observation we made after in-
specting Table 4. There is more compliance with IBM (or IBA) in treatment
GROUP than in ROLE. A MWU test yields signicance at the 5% level
(two-sided).13 This is an interesting nding that will gain further support
11Permutation tests on the basis of the average rates of compliance for the populations
show that IBM outperforms random predictions at any conventional signicance level.
12By dividing the sum of Bestand Samethrough (100 minus Di¤erent).
13All other pairwise comparisons are not statistically signicant.
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Figure 1: Distribution of individual players on the basis of the compliance rates
with IBM, all treatments pooled.
below. Intuitively, one might expect that imitation of others who are in
the same role as oneself is more appealing than imitation of a competitor
who, after all, might have a di¤erent payo¤ function. Recall that, at least
initially, our subjects do not know that they are playing a symmetric game.
Also, subjects are randomly rematched every period and cannot expect to
face the same opponents as last period.
Result 5 Imitation is signicantly more pronounced when subjects can ob-
serve their immediate competitors (as in treatment GROUP) than
when they can observe others who have the same role in di¤erent groups
(as in treatment ROLE).
4.3 Estimating imitation rules
The predictions of Schlags imitation rules Proportional Imitation, DI
and SPOR explicitly refer to the probability of imitating an action. To do
justice to these predictions, we present in this section estimates for subjects
choice functions. In particular, we analyze how subjectsdecisions to change
their action depends on their own payo¤ and the best payo¤ they observe.
Furthermore, we also analyze how the likelihood of following IBM depends
on a subjects own payo¤ and the best observed payo¤.14
14Due to the high correlation of the best max and the best average, results for IBA are
very similar and, therefore omitted.
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Table 5 shows regression results for the rst question what makes sub-
ject change their strategy. The rst column for each treatment shows esti-
mations for a simple linear probability model with random e¤ects:
Pr(sti 6= st+1i ) = + ti + (timax   ti) + vi + "ti; (1)
where sti denotes subject is strategy in period t, 
t
i the subjects own payo¤,
timax the maximal payo¤ the subject observed in his reference group, while
vi is the subject-specic random e¤ect, and "ti is the residual. Note that we
include ti directly and also in form of the payo¤ di¤erence between max
payo¤ and own payo¤. This allows to test whether only the di¤erence mat-
ters, as predicted e.g. by Schlags Proportional Imitation rule, or whether
own payo¤ and maximal payo¤ enter independently. If  is not signicantly
di¤erent from zero, then only the payo¤ di¤erence matters.
As a robustness check Table 5 also shows estimation results for a model
that includes an additional term borrowed from the reinforcement learn-
ing literature. Reinforcement learning could be seen as the main rival to
imitation in our experiment where subjects know very little about their en-
vironment.15 But including a term capturing an element of reinforcement
learning is here not so much a step toward a more complete model of what
our subjects really do but rather a check whether imitation remains a signif-
icant force when one allows for other ways of learning. As in the basic model
of Erev and Roth (1998) the propensity of a strategy is simply the sum of
all past payo¤s a player obtained with that strategy. The relative propen-
sity is the propensity of a strategy divided by the sum of the propensities
of all strategies. The regressions in Table 5 include the relative propensity
of the currently used strategy. Thus, the expected sign of the coe¢ cient is
negative. For further robustness checks Appendix D shows that the results
for all regressions are essentially the same for linear xed-e¤ects models and
random-e¤ects probit models.
The regressions consistently show that the coe¢ cients for own payo¤s are
signicantly negative while those for the observed payo¤ di¤erence between
15Similar to Erev and Roth (1999) we may assume that imitation and reinforcement
learning are just two of possibly many cognitive strategies that subjects may employ in
di¤erent situations, whichever is more appropriate or successful.
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Table 5: Estimating the likelihood that subjects change their action
ROLE GROUP FULL
constant 886 997 579 730 611 756
(42:6) (40:4) (26:9) (26:4) (44:1) (37:3)
own payo¤  :316  :289  :197  :164  :121  :077
(:033) (:033) (:024) (:024) (:029) (:029)
payo¤ di¤. :098 :100 :476 :454 :211  :208
(:035) (:034) (:043) (:043) (:032) (:031)
relative   387   418   467
propensity (37:5) (37:6) (36:5)
R2 .075 .131 .077 .146 .042 .174
# of obs. 3186 3186 3186 3186 3186 3186
Note: All coe¢ cients and standard errors multiplied by 103. Standard errors in
parentheses. denotes signicance at the 1% level,  denotes signicance at the
5% level.
own and best strategy are signicantly positive, which is in line with the
theoretical prediction. This holds for all treatments and the coe¢ cients
have the same order of magnitude. However, conrming what we have seen
in other parts of the data analysis, the coe¢ cients are largest in treatment
GROUP. Moreover, the estimated coe¢ cients turn out to be very robust
to the inclusion of the propensity term, which is signicant and has the
expected sign in all treatments. Thus, reinforcement learning seems to be
a factor and it helps to improve the explanation of the observed variance.
Nevertheless, the inclusion of the propensity term does not diminish the
signicance of the variables related to imitation.
After analyzing when subjects switch to a di¤erent action, we shall now
analyze what makes them switch to the action with the best payo¤s if they
switch at all. Table 6 reports subjectslikelihood of following IBM (contin-
gent on switching to another action)16 as a function of their own payo¤ and
the observed payo¤ di¤erence. As before the estimation results shown here
are for linear probability models with random e¤ects. Appendix D contains
xed e¤ects and probit models. The rst column for each treatment shows
16Since the theories allow for inertia, not switching is always in line with the prediction.
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Table 6: Estimating the likelihood that subjects follow IBM
ROLE GROUP FULL
constant 127 146 145 113 164 166
(41:2) (41:9) (22:5) (25:4) (43:6) (45:3)
own payo¤  :001 :004  :043  :058 :056 :056
(:038) (:038) (:030) (:030) (:038) (:039)
payo¤ di¤. :248 :246 :551 :586 :156 :156
(:038) (:038) (:045) (:047) (:040) (:040)
relative   90:1  131   13:4
propensity (4:77) (49:1) (61:6)
R2 .038 .038 .080 .087 .009 .009
# of obs. 2079 2079 1644 1644 1920 1920
Note: All coe¢ cients and standard errors multiplied by 103. Standard errors in
parentheses. Only cases with st+1i 6= sti included.  denotes signicance at the
1% level,  signicance at the 10% level.
results for:
Pr(st+1i = s
t
imax j st+1i 6= sti) = + ti + (timax   ti) + vi + "ti; (2)
where stimax is the action that had the highest maximal payo¤ (IBM) in
period t in subject is reference group and all other variables are as de-
ned before. The second column shows, as before, estimation results for a
model that includes a propensity variable, this time the propensity of the
action with the highest observed payo¤ (and thus, the expected sign of the
coe¢ cient is positive).
Table 6 shows that, as Schlags models suggest, for IBM only the payo¤
di¤erence matters. In all three treatments the coe¢ cient of the di¤erence
variable has the expected sign and is signicant at the 1% level. In con-
trast, the coe¢ cient of own payo¤ is only (weakly) signicant in treatment
GROUP and not signicantly di¤erent from zero in the other treatments.
This is strong support for all rules that satisfy Property (ii) above, in par-
ticular for Schlags Proportional Imitation rule. Moreover, the results are,
as before, robust to the inclusion of the propensity term (although this time
the propensity term does not improve the explanation of the observed vari-
ance, has an unexpected sign in treatment ROLE, and fails to be signicant
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in treatment FULL).
We briey summarize in
Result 6 In line with Schlags imitation models, estimations show that the
probability with which a subject changes his action decreases in his own
payo¤ and increases in the maximal observed payo¤. Further, the prob-
ability of imitating the best action is driven mainly by the di¤erence
between maximal observed and own payo¤.
4.4 Questionnaire results
While the choice data we collected clearly show that many of our subjects
behave as if they imitate, one cannot be sure whether subjects are aware
of what they are doing and imitate intentionally. But we have additional
evidence in form of a post-experimental questionnaire. Apart from asking for
their major eld of studies,17 we asked subjects to explain in a few words
how they made their decisions and to answer a multiple choice question
regarding the variables they based their decisions on. In particular, we
asked: Please sketch in a few words how you arrived at your decisions.
In addition, there was a multiple choice question about which variables
had impact on their decisions. Table 7 summarizes subjectsresponses to
this multiple choice question. In all treatments own past payo¤s were of
importance to a majority of subjects and in all but treatment GROUP own
payo¤s were the most frequently named factor. More than 50% of subjects
took also payo¤s of other players into consideration. Interestingly, we again
nd that subjects are more interested in imitation when they can observe
payo¤s of their immediate competitors (compare Result 5 above).
Some of the freeformat answers sketching the decision criteria employed
are also quite instructive. To summarize them we have classied the answers
into seven main categories which are shown in Table 8 together with selected
typical answers. Some subjects argued exactly as assumed by the various
imitation theories (classications groupand role). But other subjects
simply chose at random, tried to di¤erentiate themselves from the behavior
17There are no signicant e¤ects with respect to the eld of studies.
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Table 7: Multiple choice questions
Number of subjects Treatment
inuenced by... ROLE GROUP FULL
own past payo¤(s) 37 34 32
payo¤s of others in group   39 30
payo¤s of others in role 33   19
Note: There were 54 subjects per treatment. All subjects chose at least one cate-
gory, but multiple answers were possible.
of others, or followed obscure patterns. There were also subjects who were
clever enough to nd out the payo¤ structure of the game (but were often
in despair about their opponentsplay). Finally, some subjects reported to
follow only their own past payo¤s.
Table 9 lists by treatment the frequency of answers that fall into these
8 categories. Imitation of others in the same group is again a frequently
cited motivation in both, GROUP and FULL, whereas roleimitation is less
prevalent. Random behavior and ownpayo¤ driven behavior is frequent in
all treatments. But there are also types that like to di¤erentiate themselves,
types that believe in pattern or pattern recognition, and there are some
clever types that guessed the payo¤ structure correctly.
The key nding in this subsection is
Result 7 Subjects not only behave as if they imitate but many imitate inten-
tionally. Other behavioral modes like random choices, pattern driven
behavior, or behavior determined by own past payo¤s can also be ob-
served.
5 Conclusion
In contrast to traditional theories of rational behavior, imitation is a behav-
ioral rule with very soft assumptions on the rationality of agents. Im-
itation is typically modelled by assuming that subjects react to the set
of actions and payo¤s observed in the last period, by choosing an action
that was evaluated as successful. Recent theoretical results have increased
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Table 8: Classication of questionnaire answers
classication typical answer
role Answer with highest payo¤ of other players in previous round
group
When I had the highest payo¤, kept the action for the next
round. Otherwise switched to the action that brought
the highest payo¤. Sometimes had the impression that
convergent actions of all players yielded lower payo¤s.
random by chance since all attempts of a strategy failed!
contrarian
tried to act anti-cyclically, i.e. not to do what the other
Z-players have done(in treatment ROLE)
pattern
tried to nd out whether an action yielded high payo¤s
in a particular order  but pattern remained unknown
...proceeded according to the scheme: ADBECADBEC...
clever
My impression of the rule was that low letters correspond to
low numbers. The sum of payo¤s seemed to be correlated with
the sum of the letters but those with higher letters got more.
I attempted to reach AAA but my co-players liked to play E...
own found out empirically where I got most points on average
Note: These answers are typical because they are very descriptive of the categories
not because they are typical for all answers in this category.
Table 9: Frequency of questionnaire answers
classication Treatment
ROLE GROUP FULL
role 6   3
group   10 12
random 17 9 15
contrarian 5 2 5
pattern 2   6
clever   8 2
own 9 13 11
Note: A few answers were classied into two categories.
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economistsinterest in imitation. Of particular importance are results due
to VegaRedondo (1997) and Schlag (1998). Remarkably, the models make
quite di¤erent predictions in many games, most notably in Cournot games,
where the former predicts the Walrasian outcome while the latter predicts
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In principle, these di¤erences could be due
to the di¤erent adjustment rules the models employ and/or the di¤erent
informational conditions they assume. We study both rules in a general-
ized theoretical framework and show that the di¤erent predictions mainly
depend on the di¤erent informational assumptions.
Comparatively slight changes in feedback information are, thus, pre-
dicted to a¤ect behavior. Behavior is predicted to be more competitive if
agents observe their immediate rivals than if they observe others who play
in di¤erent groups against di¤erent opponents. From the vantage point of
many other (learning) theories these di¤erences appear surprising. Yet, in
an experiment we provide clear evidence for the relevance of the information
structure.
If agents only receive information about others with whom they interact,
all rules that imitate successful actions imply the Walrasian outcome as
the unique stochastically stable state. If agents only receive information
about others who have the same role as they themselves but interact in
other groups, Cournot-Nash play is the unique stochastically stable state.
If agents have both types of information, the set of stochastically stable
states depends on the specic form of the imitation rule. But, in general,
stochastically stable states range from Cournot to Walrasian outcomes in
such settings.
The experimental results provide clean evidence that changing feedback
in this manner signicantly alters behavior. Learning models that do not
take into account the observation of otherspayo¤s cannot explain this e¤ect.
Moreover, the di¤erences between treatments are ordered as the generalized
imitation model suggests. Direct support for the role of imitation is found
by analyzing individual adjustments. We nd that imitation can explain a
substantial number of adjustments and that some subjects are almost pure
imitators. Moreover, estimating subjectss choice functions we nd support
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for Schlags result that suggests that the likelihood of imitating a more
successful action increases in the di¤erence between own and others payo¤.
Finally, we observe that imitation of actions seems to be more prevalent
when subjects observe others with whom they interact as opposed to others
who have the same role but play in di¤erent groups. There is no theoretical
model that would account for such a di¤erence. Moreover, one might think
that imitation of others who are identical to oneself is more meaningful than
imitation of others with whom we play but who might be di¤erent. (After
all, subjects in our experiment did not know that they were playing a sym-
metric game.) But this is not supported by the data. One conjecture that
might explain the di¤erence we observe is that imitation of more successful
actions might be particularly appealing when one directly competes with
those who are more successful. In environments where imitation prevents
agents to do worse than their immediate competitors, there is an obvious
evolutionarybenet from imitating. Thus, evolution might have primed
us towards imitative behavior if we compete with others for the same re-
sources. This would explain our data but more theoretical work is needed to
study the evolutionary advantages and disadvantages of imitative behavior.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. First notice that if agents observe only strategies
played in the own group, the max and average evaluation rules coincide. By
standard arguments (see e.g. Samuelson, 1994) only sets of states that
are absorbing under the unperturbed (" = 0) process can be stochastically
stable. A straightforward generalization of Proposition 1 in VegaRedondo
(1997) shows that only uniform states can be absorbing (in all other states
there is at least one agent who observes a strategy that fared better than
his own), which is why we can restrict attention in the following to uniform
states.18 We will show that !e can be reached with one mutation from any
other uniform state !s 6= !e. The proof is then completed by showing that
it requires at least two mutations to leave the Walrasian state.
Consider any uniform state !s 6= !e and suppose that some player (i; j)t
switches to the Walrasian strategy e. As a consequence (i; j)t will have
the highest payo¤ in group j which will be observed by the other group
members. By property (v) all players who were in group j at time t will
play e in t + 1 with positive probability. Moreover, due to the random
matching it is possible that the three players who were in group j at time
t will be in three distinct groups in t + 1. In that case, each of them will
achieve the highest payo¤ in their respective group which will be observed
by their group members who then can also switch to the Walrasian strategy
e, such that !e is reached. (If there are more than three groups, it will
simply take a few periods more to reach !e.)
It remains to be shown that !e cannot be left with a single mutation.
This is straightforward. In fact, it follows from exactly the same argument
as in VegaRedondos result. If a player switches to some strategy s 6= e; he
will have the lowest payo¤ in his group and will therefore not be imitated.
Moreover, he observes his group members who still play e and earn more
18Notice that the random rematching of agents into groups is crucial here. If group
compositions were xed, di¤erent groups could, of course, use di¤erent strategies.
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than himself. Thus, he will switch back eventually. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Although with reference groups as in treatment
ROLE, the max and average evaluation rules do not coincide, we can use
identical arguments for both rules to prove the claim. This is due to the
fact, that we can establish the claim by restricting attention to one-shot
mutations that do not induce di¤erent payo¤s for any particular strategy an
agent observes.
By a similar argument as above, only states in which all role players in a
given role receive the same payo¤ can be candidates for stochastic stability.
We will show that the Cournot state !c can be reached with a sequence
of oneshot mutations from any other absorbing state. The proof will be
completed by showing that it requires at least two mutations to leave !c. It
is easy to see that every nonequilibrium state can be left with one mutation.
One of the players who is currently not best replying, say (i; j), must simply
switch to his best reply. This will increase (i; j)s payo¤ which will also be
observed by all other players in role i. Hence, in the next period all players
in role i may have switched to their best replies against their opponents.
Thus, for the rst claim it remains to be shown that there exists for any
state ! 6= !c a sequence of (unilateral) best replies that leads into !c. This is
easy to see by inspecting the payo¤matrix, but follows more generally from
the observation that the game has a potential (see Monderer and Shapley,
1996).
Now, consider !c and see what happens when a single player (i; j)
switches to some other strategy. As he moves away from his best reply,
he will earn less than the other agents in the same role i. As he can observe
these other agents, he will not be imitated and will eventually switch back.
Thus, it is impossible to leave !c with one mutation which completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Note again that only uniform states can be
candidates for stochastic stability. We will show that it takes one mutation
to reach the set f!c; !dg from any absorbing state not in this set while it
takes two mutations to leave this set. Consider rst a possible transition
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from !e to !c:With 1 mutation a transition to the state ! = (cee)(eee)(eee)
is possible. The two eplayers in group 1 observe two eplayers (including
themselves) that earn 400 and two others that earn 0, which is on average
200. But they also observe one cplayer who gets 300. Thus, with positive
probability in the next round all players in group 1 play c and one round
later everyone plays c. We denote this possible transition in short as:
!e
1! (cee)(eee)(eee)! (ccc)(eee)(eee)! !c;
where the number above the arrow denotes the required number of muta-
tions.
It is easy to see that the following transitions from x = a; b to y = c; d
require one mutation only,
!x
1! (yxx)(xxx)(xxx)! (yxx)(yxx)(yxx)! !y
as well as the transition from !e to !d,
!e
1! (dee)(eee)(eee)! (ddd)(eee)(eee)! !d:
Any transition from a state !y, y = c; d to some states !x; x 6= y, is
impossible with one mutation as the process must return to !y
!y
1! (xyy)(yyy)(yyy)! !y:
Transitions from f!c; !dg to !e require 2 mutations:
!c
2! (ccc)(ccc)(aec) ! (cec)(cec)(aec)! !e
!d
2! (ddd)(ddd)(ead) ! (edd)(edd)(eae)! !e:
Transitions inside the set f!c; !dg also require 2 mutations in both direc-
tions,
!d
2! (ccd)(ddd)(ddd) ! (ccc)(ddd)(ddd)! !c
!c
2! (ccc)(ccc)(adc) ! (cdc)(cdc)(adc)! !d:
Thus, f!c; !dg is the set of stochastically stable states.
35
Proof of Proposition 4. Again notice rst that in treatment FULL a
state is absorbing if and only if it is uniform. (Otherwise there are still some
actions that will eventually be imitated.) We will rst show that we can
construct sequences of one-shot mutations that lead from any of the two
collusiveuniform states (where everybody plays a or everybody plays b)
into one of the others (which we claim to be stochastically stable). Then
we will show that it requires three simultaneous mutations to leave the
more competitive states (where everybody plays c, everybody plays d, or
everybody plays e).
The rst step is easy. Consider one of the two collusive states and sup-
pose that one agent, say (i; j) switches at time t to either c; d; or e. Clearly,
this agent will have the highest overall payo¤ and can be imitated by every-
body in R(i; j). Now suppose that in t+1 agent (i; j) will only be imitated
by agents who are also in role i but not by those in his group (due to inertia).
Then each group in t + 1 will have one player with a competitive strategy
and two with collusive strategies (regardless of the matching). The highest
payo¤s are, of course, obtained by those who now play the more competitive
strategy and everybody can observe at least one of these agents. Hence, in
t+ 2 everybody will play the competitive strategy.
Next we show that it is not possible to leave one of the competitive
states with a single mutation. Take, for example, the Walrasian state, !e,
and suppose that one agent (i; j) switches at some time t to some strategy
other than e. This will have two consequences: (i; j) will earn less than
the other agents in group j but more than the other agents in role i. Now
suppose that the other agents in role i imitate (i; j) in t+ 1, but that (i; j)
himself, does not immediately switch back to e (due to inertia). Then in t+1
all players in role i will play the same strategy other than e while everybody
else will still play e. Clearly, the latter earn more than the former such that
now everybody can revert to playing e.
The same argument applies to states where everybody plays d or every-
body plays c. Moreover, a similar argument applies for the case of two
simultaneous mutations. (Again inertia can be used to compose identical
strategy proles in all groups after the mutations and the rst round of
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imitation.) The proof is completed by the observation that any uniform
state can be reached from any other uniform state by exactly three simul-
taneous mutations. For movements from less to more competitive states we
can make such a transition if all players who have the same role i simulta-
neously switch to higher quantities. For reverse movements from more to
less competitive states we can construct the transition if all players in the
same group j simultaneously switch to lower quantities.19 This completes
the proof. 
B Imitation Equilibrium
We shall briey review the recently introduced notion of an imitation equi-
librium (IE) (Selten and Ostmann, 2001), and derive its predictions for our
treatments. Unlike the preceding models, imitation equilibrium is a static
equilibrium notion. Following Selten and Ostmann (2001) we will say that
player (i; j) has an imitation opportunity if there is an skh 6= sji , skh 2 O(i; j),
such that the payo¤s of player (h; k) are the highest in R(i; j) and there is
no player in R(i; j) playing sji with payo¤s as high as (h; k).
20 A destination
is a state without imitation opportunities. An imitation path is a sequence
of states where the transition from one element of the sequence to the next
is dened by all players with imitation opportunities taking one of them.
The imitation path continues as long as there are imitation opportunities.
An imitation equilibrium is a destination that satises that all imitation
paths generated by any deviation of any one player return to the original
state. Two classes of imitation paths generated by a deviation (henceforth
called deviation paths) that return to the original state are distinguished.
(i) Deviation paths with deviator involvement : the deviator himself takes
an imitation opportunity at least once and the deviation path returns to the
original state.
19Hence, a generalization of our statement for arbitrary numbers of groups and arbitrary
group sizes is not possible. The set of stochastically stable states will, in general, depend
on whether there are more roles or more groups.
20This requirement is the same as in IBM.
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(ii)Deviation paths without deviator involvement : the destination reached
by a deviation path where the deviator never had an imitation opportunity
gives lower payo¤s to the deviator than those at the original state, making
that the deviator returns to the original strategy. This creates an imitation
path that returns to the original state.
The following proposition reveals remarkable similarities between Selten
and Ostmanns imitation equilibrium and the dynamic class of WIBM rules.
In fact, imitation equilibrium and the long-run predictions of WIBM coincide
perfectly for the current game.
Proposition 6 Imitation equilibrium (IE) is characterized by the following.
(a) In Treatment GROUP the Walrasian state !e is the unique IE.
(b) In Treatment ROLE the Cournot state !c is the unique IE.
(c) In Treatment FULL !c, !d, and !e are the only uniform IE.
Proof (a) Only uniform states can be imitation equilibria, otherwise there
would be an imitation opportunity. To see that !e is an imitation equilib-
rium note that if (i; j) deviates from !e will experience lower payo¤s than
any other player; nobody follows and (i; j) returns to e. To see that any
other uniform state is not an imitation equilibrium consider the deviation
of (i; j) to the immediate higher production level. This creates an imitation
opportunity to players in group j. By random matching this deviation may
spread out the whole population, in which case a destination is reached. At
the destination the payo¤s of (i; j) are lower than at the original distrib-
ution. Player (i; j) returns to the original action. Now players in group j
have higher payo¤s than (i; j), do not imitate him, and (i; j) has an imitation
opportunity to go back to the deviation strategy.
(b) If (i; j) deviates from !c; he will get lower payo¤s than players in role
i. Nobody follows the deviation, and (i; j) returns to c. This shows that !c
is an imitation equilibrium. It is easy to show that any state other than !c
where members of the same role play the same action, but where di¤erences
between roles are not excluded, is not an imitation equilibrium. Note then
that there is a (i; j) that is not best-replying, then a deviation of (i; j) to
his best-reply gives to him higher payo¤s, creating an imitation opportunity
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to players in role i. At this destination (i; j) has higher payo¤s than at the
original state, and hence does not return to the original action. It remains to
be shown that a state where at least one role whose members play di¤erent
actions is not an imitation equilibrium. If in such a case, in any random
matching any player has an imitation opportunity, then the assertion holds.
Assume the opposite, then since there are not two di¤erent best-replies that
give the same payo¤s, at least one player is not best-replying, and hence the
above argument shows that such a state is not an imitation equilibrium.
(c) To show in FULL that non-uniform states are not imitation equilibria
is tedious, and hence we concentrate on uniform states. We rst show that
!c is an imitation equilibrium. At !c let (i; j) deviate to sji 6= c. Then
players in role i will have higher payo¤s than (i; j) and players in group j
will observe that those players in their respective role have higher payo¤s
than (i; j). Hence, nobody follows. Then, (i; j) observes that c gives higher
payo¤s to players in role i and hence returns to c.
Now we show that !e is an imitation equilibrium. At !e let (i; j) deviate
to sji 6= e. In t + 1 players in role i will follow since will have lower payo¤s
than (i; j) and will observe that their respective group players also have
lower payo¤s than (i; j), but players in group j will not follow since will
have higher payo¤s than (i; j). In t + 2 all players in role i including (i; j)
will imitate their respective group players and hence !e is reached.
We now show that !d is an imitation equilibrium. If at !d (i; j) deviates
to sji 2 fa; b; cg, then a deviation path that returns to !d, analogous to
the one analyzed for the case of !e, is generated . If at !d, (i; j) deviates
to sji = e, then a deviation path that returns to !
d, analogous to the one
analyzed for the case of !c, is generated.
To show that !a and !b are not imitation equilibria it is enough to
show that there exists a sequence of random matchings that makes that the
imitation paths do not return to the original state. Let x = a; b and y = b
if x = a and y = c if x = b. Then, one can check that the following path
can be generated: !x ! (yxx)(xxx)(xxx) ! (yyx)(yxy)(yxx) ! !y !
(xyy)(yyy)(yyy)! !y. 
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C Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully. Do
not talk with the person sitting next to you and remain quiet during the
entire experiment. If you have any questions please ask us. We will come to
you.
During this experiment, which takes 60 rounds, you will be able to earn
points in every round. The number of points you are able to earn depends
on your actions and the actions of the other participants. The rules are very
easy. At the end of the experiment the points will be converted to Euros at
a rate of 3000:1.
Always 9 of the present participants will be evenly divided into three
roles. There are the roles X;Y; Z, taken in always by 3 participants. The
computer randomly allocates the roles at the beginning of the experiment.
You will keep your role for the course of the entire experiment.
In every round every X-participant will be randomly matched by the
computer with one Y - and one Z-participant. After this, you will have to
choose one of ve di¤erent actions, actions A;B;C;D; and E. We are not
going to tell you, how your payo¤ is calculated, but in every round your
payo¤ depends uniquely on your own decision and the decision of the two
participants you are matched with. The rule underlying the calculation of
the payo¤ is the same in all 60 rounds.
After every round you get to know how many points you earned with
your action and your cumulative points.
In addition, you will receive the following information:
[In ROLE and FULL] You get to know which actions the other two par-
ticipants who have the same role as you (and who were matched with di¤er-
ent participants) have chosen, and how many points each of them earned.
[In GROUP and FULL] You get to know which actions the other two
participants you were matched with have chosen, and how many points each
of them earned.
[In FULL] Furthermore you get to know how many points all 9 partici-
pants (in all the 3 roles) on average earned in this round.
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Those are all the rules. Should you have any questions, please ask now.
Otherwise have fun in the next 60 rounds.
D Regressions
In this appendix we show all regression results for models (1) and (2). Ta-
bles 10, 11, and 12 show the results for what makes subjects switch to
another strategy (model 1). Table 10 contains the estimations for treat-
ment GROUP, Table 11 for ROLE, and Table 12 for FULL. The rst two
columns in each table show the results from the linear random e¤ects model,
also shown in the main body of the paper. The third and fourth columns
show results obtained from a linear model with subject-specic xed e¤ects
and the fth and sixth column show estimates from a random e¤ects probit
model (marginal e¤ects at population means).
Tables 13, 14, and 15 show the results for what makes subjects follow
IBM (model 2). Table 13 contains the estimations for treatment GROUP,
Table 14 for ROLE, and Table 15 for FULL. Again, the rst two columns
in each table show the results from the linear random e¤ects model, also
shown in the main body of the paper. The third and fourth columns show
results obtained from a linear model with subject-specic xed e¤ects and
the fth and sixth column show estimates from a random e¤ects probit
model (marginal e¤ects at population means).
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Table 10: Estimating the likelihood that subjects change their actions in
treatment ROLE.
ROLE linear, random e¤ects linear, xed e¤ects
probit, random e¤ects
marginal e¤ects only
constant 886 997 879 979  
(42:6) (40:4) (35.6) (36.8)
own payo¤  :316  :289  :311  :284  :369  :325
(:033) (:033) (.033) (.033) (.04) (.04)
payo¤ di¤. :098 :100 .105 .108 .129 .133
(:035) (:034) (.035) (.034) (.04) (.04)
relative   387   353   413
propensity (37:5) (38.0) (45.9)
R2 .075 .131 .075 .129  
# of obs. 3186 3186 3186 3186 3186 3186
Note: All coe¢ cients and standard errors multiplied by 103. Standard errors in
parentheses. denotes signicance at the 1% level.
Table 11: Estimating the likelihood that subjects change their actions in
treatment GROUP.
GROUP linear, random e¤ects linear, xed e¤ects
probit, random e¤ects
marginal e¤ects only
constant 579 730 581 709  
(26:9) (26:4) (17.8) (22.5)
own payo¤  :197  :164  :195  :165  :225  :185
(:024) (:024) (.024) (.024) (.03) (.03)
payo¤ di¤. :476 :454 .448 :429 .552 .538
(:043) (:043) (.044) (.043) (.05) (.05)
relative   418   355   457
propensity (37:6) (39.3) (46.1)
R2 .077 .146 .077 .145  
# of obs. 3186 3186 3186 3186 3186 3186
Note: All coe¢ cients and standard errors multiplied by 103. Standard errors in
parentheses. denotes signicance at the 1% level.
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Table 12: Estimating the likelihood that subjects change their actions in
treatment FULL
FULL linear, random e¤ects linear, xed e¤ects
probit, random e¤ects
marginal e¤ects only
constant 611 756 613 736  
(44:1) (37:3) (31.2) (32.9)
own payo¤  :121  :077  :123  :089  :148  :104
(:029) (:029) (.029) (.029) (.04) (.04)
payo¤ di¤. :211 :208 :208 .204 .275 .277
(:032) (:031) (.032) (.031) (.04) (.04)
relative   467   389   516
propensity (36:5) (38.1) (50.1)
R2 .042 .174 .042 .166  
# of obs. 3186 3186 3186 3186 3186 3186
Note: All coe¢ cients and standard errors multiplied by 103. Standard errors in
parentheses. denotes signicance at the 1% level,  denotes signicance at the
5% level.
Table 13: Estimating the likelihood that subjects follow IBM in treatment
ROLE.
ROLE linear, random e¤ects linear, xed e¤ects
probit, random e¤ects
marginal e¤ects only
constant 127 146 122 148  
(41:2) (41:9) (39.7) (40.8)
own payo¤  :001 :004  :002  :009  :015  :011
(:038) (:038) (.038) (.038) (.04) (.04)
payo¤ di¤. :248 :246 .249 .248 .234 .233
(:038) (:038) (.038) (.038) (.04) (.04)
relative   90:1   126   113
propensity (47:7) (48.6) (50.7)
R2 .038 .038 .038 .037  
# of obs. 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079
Note: All coe¢ cients and standard errors multiplied by 103. Standard errors in
parentheses. denotes signicance at the 1% level,  denotes signicance at the
5% level,  denotes signicance at the 10% level.
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Table 14: Estimating the likelihood that subjects follow IBM in treatment
GROUP.
GROUP linear, random e¤ects linear, xed e¤ects
probit, random e¤ects
marginal e¤ects only
constant 145 113 116 111  
(22:5) (25:4) (21:2) (24:9)
own payo¤  :043  :058  :013  :015  :069  :077
(:030) (:030) (:031) (:030) (:04) (:04)
payo¤ di¤. :551 :586 :577 :582 :546 :565
(:045) (:047) (:045) (:047) (:05) (:05)
relative  131  20:5  98:5
propensity (49:1) (56:5) (55:3)
R2 .080 .087 .078 .080  
# of obs. 1644 1644 1644 1644 1644 1644
Note: All coe¢ cients and standard errors multiplied by 103. Standard errors in
parentheses. denotes signicance at the 1% level  denotes signicance at the
5% level.  denotes signicance at the 10% level.
Table 15: Estimating the likelihood that subjects follow IBM in treatment
FULL
FULL linear, random e¤ects linear, xed e¤ects
probit, random e¤ects
marginal e¤ects only
constant 164 166 154 159  
(43:6) (45:3) (40:5) (45:3)
own payo¤ :056 :056 :059 :059  :057  :057
(:038) (:039) (:038) (:039) (.04) (.04)
payo¤ di¤. :156 :156 :152 :151 .165 .164
(:040) (:040) (:040) (:040) (.04) (.04)
relative   13:4   22:1   15:2
propensity (61:6) (62:4) (65.2)
R2 .009 .009 .009 .009  
# of obs. 1920 1920 1920 1920 3186 3186
Note: All coe¢ cients and standard errors multiplied by 103. Standard errors in
parentheses. denotes signicance at the 1% level.
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